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14.1  Introduction 
Much empirical research has been devoted to  examining the effects of 
social security and private  pension  wealth  on household  savings.  In 
contrast there has been very little study of  the consequences of pension 
wealth for the composition of  household portfolios. Given that the two 
types of  pension wealth are not perfect substitutes for other assets, it is 
likely that they would  affect optimum portfolio choices among other 
assets.  This  microeconomic impact  has macroeconomic  implications. 
Because the financial structure of  the private sector’s net worth is an 
important determinant of both real decisions (corporate investment, for 
example) and financial variables (such as interest rates and their term 
structure), any effect of  pension wealth on the portfolio composition of 
households’ nonpension wealth will have macroeconomic consequences. 
In this chapter we estimate the portfolio effect of  pension wealth using 
individual data for 10,118 Canadian households. Throughout the chapter 
we regard pension wealth as an exogenous variable beyond the control of 
an individual household. Although this is clearly true of social security 
wealth, it is possible  to alter  private  pension wealth  by  choosing  an 
occupation which offers  more or  less attractive retirement compensation. 
We shall ignore this possible source of endogeneity. 
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To model asset demands satisfactorily, our specification must allow for 
the empirical observation that most households do not own all of  the 
assets which we are able to distinguish. For each of the 12 assets in our 
study there is a significant number of  households with zero holdings, and 
only two households own all 12 assets. We construct below a model of the 
probability of  owning a particular combination of assets. In the estima- 
tion of individual asset demand equations, the failure of  households to 
hold complete portfolios leads to two problems. First, the demand for an 
asset depends on the particular combination of  other assets in the port- 
folio. Second, estimates of demand equations which use data only for 
those households with positive holdings will be subject to sample selec- 
tion bias. We discuss, and attempt to resolve, these econometric  difficul- 
ties in section 14.3. 
Because our sample consists of a single cross section of households, we 
cannot examine the effects on portfolio behavior of variables which are 
uniform across households.  These are variables which,  although they 
may  vary  over time, are identical for  all households  at the date of 
interview. The most important of such variables are the relative prices of 
different assets, including the inflation rate.’  One exception is that part of 
the price which reflects households’ marginal tax rates. The data on net 
worth are, however, both comprehensive and of good quality, and we are 
able to compute estimates of  both social security and private. pension 
wealth. There is also substantial variance of  pension wealth among the 
population, which allows us to identify the effects of pension wealth on 
the dependent variables. The sample and the construction of estimates 
of tax rates, pension wealth, and permanent income for each household 
in the sample are described in sections 14.2 and 14.4. In section 14.3 
we  discuss  alternative  approaches to  modeling  the  mixed  discrete- 
continuous portfolio choice problem facing households and explain our 
preferred method. Estimates of the model are contained in section 14.5, 
and simulations of the effects of changing the levels of both social security 
and private pension wealth  on portfolio composition  are presented in 
section 14.6. This section also contains estimates of the effect of the two 
types of pension wealth on total household savings. 
14.2  The Sample 
The data used in this study refer to 12,734 Canadian families in 1977 
and come from the Statistics Canada micro-data tape, Income (1976), 
Assets and Debts (1977) of  Economic Families and Unattached Indi- 
viduals, which contains data collected as a supplement to the 1977 Survey 
of Consumer Finances.’ Unless otherwise stated, all tables are derived 
from this tape and money figures are expressed in Canadian dollars. The 
survey covers a stratified random sample of the noninstitutional popula- 401  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
tion and provides a particularly rich source of information on household 
ownership of  assets and liabilities, incomes,  and other individual and 
household characteristics. A family or household will be defined here as a 
group sharing a common dwelling and related by blood or marriage. The 
data refer to market values in May 1977 and the income data to the 
calendar year 1976. For the econometric analysis 2,616 households were 
excluded. These included 139 “special family units,” primarily those with 
high incomes, for whom data on age and other characteristics were not 
recorded on the tape to protect their identity. Because our main interest 
is in estimating equations in which the dependent variables are relative 
shares of  assets in household portfolios, neither this omission nor the 
stratification of  the sample leads us to suspect sample selection bias. In 
addition, of  the total value of  assets and debts held by the complete 
sample  (computed  using  population  weights),  these  “special  family 
units” only held 7.3% and 2.4%, respectively. The sample was further 
reduced  to  10,118 households  by  deleting  households  headed  by  a 
woman, for reasons explained below in the construction of permanent 
income. 
The data on net worth are given for 15 categories of  assets and liabili- 
ties. These were aggregated into 12 classes for the portfolio composition 
analysis by  defining equity in owner-occupied housing to be net of  any 
mortgage liability and equity in own businesses to be net of loans specifi- 
cally for this purpose, and by aggregating two forms of  consumer debt 
into a single category of  personal debt. The 12 assets are: cash, deposits, 
bonds,  stocks  and shares,  registered  home ownership  savings plans 
(RHOSP), registered retirement savings plans (RRSP), other nonliquid 
financial  assets  (ONLFA), passenger  cars,  equity in  owner-occupied 
housing, equity in other real estate, equity in a business or farm, and 
personal debt. Market values of  assets are recorded (for cars and equity 
in real estate and own businesses these are the respondents’ own esti- 
mates) except for bonds, which are given at face value. In all the tables, 
and in the presentation of  the empirical results presented, debt is mea- 
sured as a positive variable. The survey data exclude social security and 
pension wealth (which we discuss below), consumer durables other than 
cars, equity in life insurance, and other assets such as the expected value 
of  future inheritances  and support from  relatives  and children.  The 
percentage composition of  wealth by asset is given in table 14.1. Column 
1 gives the share of  assets in the total wealth of  the sample of  12,734 
households using population weights. These weights were not used in 
calculating the shares in columns 2 and 3. In the second column are the 
shares of assets in the total wealth of  the sample used for our empirical 
work. The third column shows the average of  the asset shares of  indi- 
vidual households in the same sample as column 2. This is in contrast to 
columns 1  and 2, which are the asset shares of the aggregate portfolios of 402  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
Table 14.1  Percentage Composition of Wealth by Asset, 1977 
(Shares Are Defined with Respect to Total Assets) 
Average of  Individual 
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"Calculated over all 12,734 households using population weights. 
bCalculated over sample of  9,788 households, with no weights applied. 
'Authors'  estimates. 
their respective samples. In effect, the shares in the second column are a 
weighted estimate of those in column 3, where the weights are individual 
household wealth. 
As the focus of this study is portfolio composition, any variation across 
assets in the accuracy of the data will be critical. Detailed evaluations of 
the data can be found in Statistics Canada (1979) and Oja (1981), and the 
ensuing discussion draws heavily on these sources. To assess the quality 
of  the data involves a comparison with outside estimates of  the wealth 
components, and these in turn are unlikely to be free of all error. If we 
ignore this, then discrepancies between the two may be attributed to 
sampling error, incomplete response rates, and underreporting  in the 
survey data. As we employ the data in unweighted form and do not 
address  issues of wealth distribution or  of  the level of national wealth, the 
first source of  error is not of concern to us. The overall response rate was 
79.7%, and where imputations of  items of wealth were made, they were 
generally no greater than 10% in magnitude. Oja (1981) concludes that 
neither of  these sources of error in the data is a major concern. 403  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
This suggests that underreporting is the main source of error. Davies 
(1979), in a study of  a similar survey in 1970, concluded that the major 
source of  underreporting is nonreporting of  assets at the household level. 
This may affect both the probit and share demand parameter estimates. 
However, compared to  previous surveys some improvements were intro- 
duced in the 1977 survey. Real assets, which account for about 80% of 
nonpension wealth, appear to be accurately recorded in the 1977 survey. 
The grossed-up value of  each of  the financial assets and debt varies from 
20-30% to 90-100% of  outside estimates. It should be noted, however, 
that these figures refer to a comparison of  aggregate values of  wealth 
items and therefore include all three sources of  error. 
14.3  An Econometric Model 
In our data set we are able to distinguish  between 12 assets (to be 
precise, 11 assets and one category of  debt). Most models of  portfolio 
behavior predict that, in the absence of  restrictions, individuals would 
choose to hold nonzero quantities of  all assets. Table 14.2 shows the 
distribution of  households by  the number of  assets held and illustrates 
that such a prediction is only accurate for two households in our sample. 
To  ignore this  feature of  household  behavior  would  be  not only to 
produce biased estimates of the parameters of the demand functions for 
assets but also to  ignore a misspecification in that the demand for an asset 
depends on the set of  other assets  held  by  an  investor.  It is  clear, 
therefore, that the principal econometric difficulty we face is to estimate 
Table 14.2  Distribution of Household Portfolios 
by  Number of  Assets Held, 1977 
Number of 
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jointly  the decisions of  how  many  and which  assets to hold  and the 
quantity of  each asset which is held conditional on its ownership. This 
raises a number of interesting econometric issues (discussed more fully in 
King [1982]) which have been ignored in previous studies. In one of the 
few published econometric studies of  portfolio composition, Feldstein 
(1976) simply excluded households that did not have positive holdings of 
any assets. 
The  theoretical considerations which suggest that individuals may hold 
incomplete portfolios are of  two kinds. First, there are partial equilibrium 
factors such as transactions costs, which may be interpreted in a broad 
sense to include the costs of monitoring and managing a portfolio. Econo- 
mies of scale may imply that it is optimal to select a portfolio with only a 
limited number of assets. Second, there are general equilibrium effects. 
Auerbach and King (1982) show that in a world of distortionary taxes, no 
equilibrium can exist without constraints on individual portfolios. Con- 
straints  on short sales are the most obvious example, and these lead to an 
equilibrium in which investors have specialized portfolios. The asset (or 
assets) in which an investor specializes is determined by his marginal tax 
rate. Auerbach and King (1982) model explicitly the case of three assets: 
corporate equity, corporate bonds, and municipal bonds.  But similar 
considerations apply to a world with many assets. Complete specializa- 
tion in a single asset (the most favored for tax purposes) results only if it is 
possible to achieve the constrained optimal allocation of  consumption 
over states of the world by owning only the assets in question. If, as will be 
the case in  practice,  this is impossible, the particular  combination of 
assets owned by an individual will reflect the trade-off between considera- 
tions of tax savings and aversion to risk. 
In principle,  therefore, we  need to construct  a  joint discrete  and 
continuous choice model. We cannot simply estimate an asset demand 
system using observations of those with positive holdings for two reasons. 
First,  not all households  own  each asset,  and  to omit the sample of 
nonholders would lead to sample selection bias. This problem is familiar. 
The second difficulty is less familiar and more serious. The proportion of 
an individual’s wealth which is invested in a particular asset depends on 
the combination of  assets in the portfolio. Suppose, for example, that an 
individual holds  only one other asset in addition to asset j.  Then the 
proportion of  his wealth invested in asset j will clearly differ from that 
which he would invest if  he owned all 12 assets given values for observ- 
able characteristics. The discrete and continuous aspects of  the problem 
are obviously inseparable. 
Suppose that households maximize expected utility as a function of the 
12 asset holdings subject to both a budget constraint and a set of  short 
sales constraints on each of  the assets. The resulting set of first-order 
conditions may be inverted to give asset demand functions only if  we 405  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
know which constraints are binding, that is, if we know which combina- 
tion of assets the household owns. The first-order conditions do not tell us 
this. It is for this reason that a multivariate tobit specification, although a 
seemingly natural way to model the problem, is an inappropriate spec- 
ification. The multivariate tobit model (see Amemiya 1974; Lee 1981) 
embodies the essential feature of a tobit model that a single index for each 
asset determines both the discrete and continuous outcomes. But this is 
not the correct representation of  the behavior of  an optimizing investor 
subject  to short sales constraints (this is demonstrated formally and 
discussed further in King [1982]). The solution to  the  investor’s optimiza- 
tion problem is twofold: that combination of  assets is chosen which leads 
to the highest level of  expected utility, and, given this optimal combina- 
tion, the corresponding set of  first-order conditions may be inverted to 
determine asset demands. The discrete choice amounts to selecting from 
a very large number of  mutually exclusive alternatives. In fact, with J 
assets the number of  distinct combinations of  assets is equal to 2J.3  For 12 
assets this means we have 4,096 mutually exclusive alternatives. Optimal 
asset demands are given by a switching regressions model in which the 
demand system depends on the particular combination of assets owned. 
Again the number of regimes is equal to the number of possible combina- 
tions. 
To estimate individual equations for the probability of owning each of 
these  2J alternatives would  almost certainly involve more parameters 
than we have observations, even with a sample of  10,118 households. 
Moreover, with the same number of regimes we cannot estimate distinct 
demand equations for each regime. The only feasible approach is to 
compute the implied probabilities of all mutually exclusive combinations 
containing the asset in question. Suppose that alternative i is chosen if the 
following linear index is positive, if 
(1)  xp, + u,>0,  i= 1, . . . 2J, 
where Xis a (1 x N)  row vector of N observable characteristics and pi  is 
an (N  x 1) column vector of  associated parameters. 
The u, are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, 
with  a distribution function  denoted by  F. Let d, denote a vector of 
dummy variables with the  ifh element equal to unity if  the investor owns 
combination  i and all other elements equal to zero. The probability of 
holding asset j  may then be written as 
p(j)  = c !_X,pdid6 s  1 all i containing j, 
IES 
where p is an (N  x I)  matrix of parameters. 
The determinants of  the probability  of  owning asset j can be repre- 
sented as interaction terms between observable characteristics and dum- 
my variables for the combinations of  other assets owned by  the indi- 406  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn  A. King 
vidual. Again this involves an  excessively large number of parameters. To 
reduce the number of  parameters to a feasible  magnitude, we must 
assume some  independence  between combinations. If  we assume that the 
effects of observable characteristics on the probability of choosing asset j 
are independent of  the particular combination, then the probability is a 
function  of  characteristics and dummy  variables  with  no interaction 
terms. This still implies a very large number of parameters, because there 
are as many dummy variables as there are combinations of  assets contain- 
ing assetj. (The  precise number is 2’-l,  which in our case is 2,048.)4  But if 
we are prepared to  assume independence  over  observable characteristics, 
we might as well assume independence over unobservable characteris- 
tics. This assumption implies that the probability of choosing asset j is a 
function of observable characteristics and independent of the other assets 
owned (an alternative  derivation of this specification is given in King 
[1982]). There are  no  cross-equation constraints because the probabilities 
of  owning  each  asset  do not sum to unity.  Hence we  shall estimate 
independent probit equations for each asset in turn. 
The continuous choice open to a household is its demand for assets 
given the combination of assets which forms its optimal portfolio. The 
functional form of the demand for a given asset depends on the other 
assets owned, and there is a discrete jump in the demand function as the 
combination of assets owned changes. If  households face short-selling 
constraints,  these jumps embody the “spill-over’’  effects of  the con- 
straints on asset demands. As the dependent variable we take the logistic 
transformation of the proportion of wealth invested in each asset. We use 
this transformation  to justify our assumptions about parameter restric- 
tions below and to reduce heteroscedasticity. The demand function for 
asset j  is: 
where  pj  is the proportion of wealth invested in asset j,  C,  is the constant 
term, and 2 is a vector of  observable characteristics. All parameters, as 
written, are indexed by the Combination of assets in the portfolio denoted 
by i which runs from i = 1, . . . ,  2J. In this general form there are again 
too many parameters. We shall consider a simple case of the shift effect of 
different assets combinations in which 8,  = Oj for all i and 
J- 1 
k=l 
Cij=  2  Ckjdki  (4) 
for all i,j. 
In other words, the constant term for a particular combination is equal 
to the sum of  fixed coefficients for each asset contained in the combina- 
tion  (where dki is unity  if  combination  i contains asset  K, and zero 401  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
otherwise). These assumptions imply that the effect of  adding an addi- 
tional asset, or of a change in one of the exogenous variables, on the 
demand for an asset  is independent of  the other variables  or assets 
owned, except insofar as it affects the value of p,  the proportion of  the 
portfolio invested in the asset. The absence of interaction terms is ren- 
dered more plausible by the logistic specification of the dependent vari- 
able. With these assumptions the explanatory variables in (3) are the 
vector 2 and the 11 dummy variables corresponding to all assets other 
than j.  The equations we shall estimate are 
We shall be particularly interested in those variables relating to social 
security and private pension wealth. Because of the logistic transforma- 
tion, the system of J equations given by (5)  does not satisfy the aggrega- 
tion condition that 
J 
;=  1  z  pi=l. 
We judged it better to sacrifice the imposition of  the adding-up con- 
straint to obtain the benefits described above. Although we report below 
the results of estimating equation (5)  for all 12  assets, when simulating the 
model to examine the effects of  change in pension wealth or portfolio 
composition we shall drop one of  the equations. This is described further 
in section 14.6. 
Equations (5)  were estimated using observations for those with posi- 
tive holdings of  the asset in the dependent variable. To correct for sample 
selection bias we included the inverse of  Mills’s ratio from the estimated 
probit equations as an additional regressor (Heckman 1979). For a dis- 
cussion of  the assumption of the joint normality of u, and the error term in 
the probit  equation, see King  (1982).  This procedure  does not  give 
consistent standard errors, but we computed a consistent estimate of  the 
covariance matrix using the results of Greene (1981). These adjustments 
deal with  those people who  do not  own  the asset in question.  Less 
significant is the issue of  how to deal with those households which report 
that they own only one asset. It would be possible to deal with this by 
including an additional inverse  Mills’s ratio in the regression using a 
bivariate probit analysis, but there are strong reasons for supposing that 
in these cases the data are misrecorded, and so we have chosen to omit 
the observations with  portfolios  consisting  only of  one asset. In any 
event, the numbers involved are very small. For five assets the number of 
such cases is zero and in three further cases it is three or less. For deposits 
it is 69, for cash 141, for passenger cars 63,  and for home ownership 50. 408  Louis-David L. Dicks-MireauxlMervyn  A. King 
14.4  The Construction of Data 
In this  section we  explain  how  we  computed estimates of  pension 
wealth and tax rates. The method employed to construct estimates of 
permanent income for each individual in the sample is described in the 
appendix and is a summary of  that given in King and Dicks-Mireaux 
(1982). 
The most important component of  wealth for which we do not have 
direct observations is the value of  the right to future private pensions and 
old age social security payments. Social security wealth is defined as that 
accruing from the public retirement income system. It comes from five 
sources: Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(GIs), the Spouses’ Allowance  (SPA), and the Canada and  Quebec 
Pension Plans (CQPP). The OAS provides flat-rate benefits which are 
taxable, and were equal to $1,634.34 in 1976 to those aged 65 and over. 
Eligibility for GIS is based on receipt of OAS, and those who have no 
income other than OAS receive the maximum benefit of $1,146.30 and 
$2,035.80 (in 1976), for single and two-pensioner families, respectively. 
The SPA is payable to a pensioner’s spouse, provided he or she is 60-64 
years old and would, except for age, qualify for OAS and the GIS at the 
two-pensioner family rate. Both these benefits are reduced, at different 
rates, if income is received from sources other than OAS. These benefits 
have been fully indexed to increases in the consumer price index (CPI) 
since 1972 and are all financed from general tax revenue. 
The Canada and Quebec pension plans, which are virtually identical 
with automatic transferability of benefit credits, were established in 1965 
and cover almost the entire labor force. Both plans are contributory and 
earnings related. Contributions  are paid by individuals aged 18-70  years 
and not  receiving plan  benefits,  at a rate of  3.6% shared equally by 
employers  and employees  and  paid  in  full  by  the self-employed, on 
earnings between a lower and upper bound. Both plans provide three 
types of benefits: retirement pensions, survivors’ benefits, and disability 
benefits. 
Since 1976 the eligible age for receipt of  retirement benefits has been 
65. The benefit level  is calculated as 25% of  adjusted career average 
earnings (ACAE), multiplied by the average value of  the yearly max- 
imum pensionable earnings (YMPE) in the final 3 working years. The 
ACAE is the mean value of the ratio (with a maximum value of one) of 
earnings to YMPE in the best 85% of  earning years. The intent of  the 
system appears to be to index the YMPE to the average wage and salary 
index,  although  in  practice  it has on occasion failed  to achieve  this. 
Benefit  payments  are indexed to the CPI. Survivors’ benefits include 
death benefits, surviving spouses’ pensions, disabled widowers’ pensions, 
and orphans’ benefits. The surviving spouses’ pensions (the one of  most 409  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
concern  to us)  are 60%  of  that which would have been  paid to the 
deceased contributor if  the spouse is 65 years or older, plus a flat-rate 
component if  aged 45-65. For those less than 45 years old, the pension 
level is determined  by  age, the number of  dependent  children, and 
disability. 
The plan is a recent one and transitional arrangements were used to 
introduce it, which created further variation in the value of pension rights 
across individuals. Persons aged 55 and less in 1966 were to be eligible for 
full pensions at age 65; in effect, the closer an individual was to age 55 in 
1966 the greater the “bonus” or net benefit received. Those who were 56 
or more years old would contribute for less than 10 years and receive a 
prorated pension. 
For each individual in the sample we constructed an estimate of  the 
present  value of  social security wealth, using estimated  age-earnings 
profiles (for  the CQPP  component),  and the relevant  survival prob- 
abilitie~.~  For the present value calculation the nominal discount rate was 
chosen to be equal to the rate of change of the wage and salary index. In 
other words, for the pension plans, the real discount factor for the years 
up to the age of retirement is one. The rate of inflation was assumed to be 
5% ,  so that for the postretirement years the real discount rate is 2.5%, 
which is the growth rate of productivity (or the difference in the growth 
rates of  the wage and salary and consumer price indexes). For wives 
allowance was made for nonparticipation in the labor force at various 
stages of the life cycle by adjusting the level of the age-earnings profile in 
a fashion identical to that used  in  estimating permanent  income.  In 
addition to the retirement pension, only the surviving spouse’s pension, 
for those over 45, was included in the calculation. In computing the 
flat-rate components of social security wealth, we assumed that everyone 
of at least 65 years of age receives OAS. We made no allowance for SPA 
because the age-earnings profile implicitly assumes that spouses effec- 
tively work until they are 65. Current and future eligibility for the GIS 
was determined using the appropriate needs test. 
In estimating the present value of  private pension wealth, actual re- 
ceipts were used for retirees, and an expected pension was imputed for 
those in pension plans who were below retirement age (assumed to be 
65). The imputation was based on a regression for pension receipts of 
retirees in terms of permanent income, age, and occupation. To allow for 
sample selection bias the inverse Mills’s ratio, computed from a probit 
model of positive pension receipts for retirees, was included as an ex- 
planatory variable. To convert these benefit levels into a present value it 
is necessary to make some assumption about current and future pre- and 
postretirement indexation. Indexation provisions vary widely across pen- 
sion plans, and any assumption (although we do take notice of  what 
evidence is available) applied uniformly across households will be only an 410  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
approximation.6  The heterogeneity of  the pension plans across occupa- 
tions  will  be  captured  to  some extent in  the imputation of  pension 
receipts.  We assume that prior  to retirement ,  benefits are effectively 
indexed to the rate of  growth of  wages and salaries. Postretirement we 
assume the level of indexation is 60% of the CPI, which, given the rate of 
inflation of  5%, yields a real discount rate for postretirement years of 
4.5%.  With the information  available, it was difficult to incorporate 
survivors’ pensions. The procedure used assumes that any living spouse 
will be entitled to one-half of the household’s pension income, regardless 
of  whether he or she is widowed. 
A more detailed description of the Canadian retirement income system 
and of the construction of  the wealth estimates is presented in  Dicks- 
Mireaux (1981).’ Mean values of  wealth in these various forms in the 
sample of 10,118 households were the following: for net worth recorded 
in the survey, $53,611; social security wealth, $72,455; and for the 4,381 
households with private pension wealth, $60,587. 
In this final section we briefly examine how personal saving is treated 
for tax purposes and describe how the marginal tax rate was computed for 
each household. Both are done with respect to the 1976 tax law, to which 
the recorded income data relate. The first $1,000 of interest and dividend 
income, as of 1974 and 1975, respectively (with capital gains included in 
1977), are tax exempt. Unlike the United States, Canada has no exemp- 
tion for state and local bond interest income. Since 1972 realized capital 
gains have been taxed with a 50% exclusion provision and no distinction 
between short- and long-run gains. Associated outlays and expenses may 
be excluded, but there is no adjustment for inflation when calculating 
taxable gains.8 
The Canadian Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan (RHOSP) 
originated in 1974. It permits tax deductions for contributions of  up to 
$1,000 per year, with  a lifetime maximum total of  $10,000 excluding 
interest earned and accumulated in the plan, for up to 20 years. With- 
drawn funds are not taxed insofar as they are used to acquire an owner- 
occupied home. In addition, when this wealth is transformed into a house 
its imputed income is untaxed. Canada differs from the United States in 
that mortgage interest and local property taxes are not deductible. 
The tax treatment of private pension plans, since 1972, is like that of an 
expenditure tax. Contributions are exempt, and receipts less $1,000 for 
those over 65 are taxed. All federal pension receipts are taxed, unlike 
United  States  social  security.  Registered  Retirement  Savings  Plans 
(RRSP) were introduced in 1957 and are available to e~eryone.~  Their tax 
treatment is the same as that for private pension plans except that there is 
a maximum deduction on contributions:  ($3,500), $5,500 or 20%  of 
earned income, whichever is less, if  (were) not covered by  a private 
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to pay premiums into his own RRSP is also tax deductible. It is worth 
noting that contribution  limits were very low at first and were raised 
substantially in 1971 and 1976. 
In Canada husbands and wives are assessed separately for tax pur- 
poses. For the econometric analysis of household portfolio composition, 
the relevant marginal tax rate was taken to be that of the male household 
head. In married households some account should be made for wives 
purchasing or holding assets. One would expect, however, that in gen- 
eral, rational cooperative behavior would allocate the legal pattern of 
ownership  and purchases  so that tax savings were maximized,  which 
would equalize the marginal tax rates faced by husbands and wives.Io  In 
this case the husband’s tax rate is indeed appropriate for our purposes. 
The  calculated marginal tax rate is potentially endogenous with respect 
to portfolio composition. Only total earnings and total income of  the 
husband are recorded in the survey, and therefore taxable income had to 
be estimated. This was done as follows.” Total income was calculated as 
net employment income plus unearned income. Of the deductions which 
can be applied to this to  derive net total income, allowance was made for 
those relating to Canada and Quebec and employer-sponsored pension 
plan contributions, unemployment insurance premiums, and registered 
home ownership plans. In addition to the basic exemption, those related 
to age, marriage, and wholly dependent children were applied to net 
income to give taxable income. In the absence of  any information on 
expenditures and the different  kinds of  unearned income, it was not 
possible to take into account any other exemptions or deductions. The 
tax rate was then computed and incorporates the provincial tax laws 
which consist of a tax rate applied to the basic federal  tax payable.I2  Table 
14.3  shows the mean values of the constructed variables and asset shares, 
for each subsample with positive holdings of  each asset. 
14.5  Empirical Results 
In this section the empirical estimates of  the discrete and continuous 
choice models of  asset demands are presented. Table 14.4 shows the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model for positive holdings 
of  each asset.” A priori, it is not clear what effect on the probability of 
holding each asset one should expect of the three components of wealth. 
For example, both social security and private pension wealth  may be 
thought of  as real illiquid assets; though less so, in both respects, for the 
latter.  Consequently, one might  expect  their presence  to reduce  the 
likelihood of  holding  assets with similar characteristics. On the other 
hand, some illiquid assets may not be perceived by households to be part 
of  retirement saving-for  example, cars-while  liquid financial  assets 
such as bonds may be. As shown by the coefficients on the three wealth- Table 14.3  Wealth, Portfolio, Income, and Tax Characteristics for Subsamples with Positive Holdings of  Each Asset 
(All Figures Are Calculated as Means of Individual Observations for Which pi  + 1) 
Assets 
Stocks  Real  Busi- 
De-  and  Home  Estate  ness 
Total  posits  Bonds  Cash  Shares  RHOSP  RRSP  ONLFA  Cars  Equity  Equity  Equity  Debt 
Variable"  Sample  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Share of  asset in  . . .  17.7  10.1  1.8  7.8  12.0  9.0  14.0  19.4  60.8  30.1  48.1  157.3 
total assets (p,), '36 
SSWIW  1.3  14.4  2.2  15.7  2.2  1.0  8.5  2.5  6.6  2.6  2.0  0.5  6.1 
PPWIW  0.5  3.4  2.1  3.3  0.9  3.3  9.4  0.3  2.8  0.9  0.8  0.1  3.5 
WI Y  2.4  2.9  3.7  2.8  5.0  2.2  4.5  6.0  2.8  3.6  4.8  7.1  2.2 
SSWIY  3.2  3.5  3.4  3.6  3.2  2.8  3.2  3.6  3.6  3.8  3.7  4.1  3.5 
PPWIY  1.2  1  .0  1.3  1  .o  1.5  1.6  1.4  1  .o  1.0  1  .o  1.1  0.5  1.1 
Permanent income  22,598  21,367  22,683  21,084  24,734  27,785  25,087  21,437  21,860  20,776  21,669  20,446  22,849 
Marginal tax rate  30.3  31.1  33.9  30.7  37.6  36.3  38.4  33.6  31.9  31.1  34.0  31.0  32.4 
of  household  head 
No. of  observations  9,788  8.789  2,592  8.676  895  447  1,630  751  8,295  6,960  1,906  1,876  6,327 
for which p, >  0 and 
No. of  observations  330  69  3  141  0  0  0  0  63  50  0  2  3 
for which p, = 1 
(Y),  $'s 
P, f 1 
'W = net worth: SSW = social security wealth; PPW  = private pension wealth. 413  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
to-permanent-income ratios, all three types of wealth do have significant 
effects on the choice of  which asset to hold. The effect of  the level of 
wealth differs between its three components. Except in the case of debt, 
the probability of  holding each asset rises with the ratio of nonpension 
wealth W to permanent income. Private pension wealth has a significant 
positive influence on holdings for all assets except business equity and 
ONLFA, and is particularly strong for deposits, bonds, cars, and home 
equity. This form of  wealth does not appear to be very different from 
nonpension wealth. In contrast, however, we observe that social security 
wealth has significant negative effects on positive holdings of  deposits, 
bonds, home equity, and  to a  lesser extent stocks and shares. Both 
private pension and social security wealth have similar positive effects on 
the discrete choice to own an RRSP, the former being statistically more 
significant. 
Clearly, as we argued earlier, the marginal tax rate has a significant 
influence on the discrete choice to hold particular assets, for example a 
positive one on stocks and shares and RRSPs.14  Because of  our inability to 
observe whether individuals have or have not exhausted the tax deduc- 
tions or exemptions associated with a particular asset, the exact inter- 
pretation is not quite as clear-cut. In general, permanent income Y has a 
significant  positive  effect. The negative influence on home equity (in 
comparison to that on RHOSPs) is, perhaps, surprising. However, the 
positive effect on holding an RHOSP may be largely related to the tax 
savings it offers via income averaging, regardless of whether or not it is 
ultimately used to purchase a home. Also, unlike the United States, the 
tax advantage  of home ownership versus renting is limited to the nontaxa- 
tion of  imputed income from the former. Its insignificance in the cash 
equation attests  to the transactions role of cash. Low household earnings, 
which may reflect transitory shocks or the position on the age-earnings 
profile, in contrast tend to have a negative influence. Either asset hold- 
ings have been run down or, simply, little or no saving is possible. The 
apparently contradictory positive effect on holdings of bonds, stocks and 
shares, and other nonliquid financial assets may reflect that households 
with these assets may receive most of  their total income from them. 
Of  the remaining explanatory variables, low age has a negative effect 
except on business equity (youthful entrepreneurship) and debt. Educa- 
tion when significant has a positive influence; its insignificant role in cash 
and home equity is understandable, but with regard to business equity it 
is perhaps surprising. Marriage has mixed effects: a strong role in owning 
a home, and a negative role in holding an RHOSP or RRSP. 
Estimates of relative asset share demand equations are given in table 
14.5, at the end of  which is a detailed description of  the explanatory 
variables used. These equations model the continuous choice of  how 
much to hold of each asset given the choice of which assets are held. 414  Louis-David L. Dicks-MireauxIMervyn  A.  King 
Table 14.4  Probit Model for Positive Asset Holdings 





Explanatory  Deposits  Bonds  Cash  Shares  RHOSP 
Variable"  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant 
Marginal tax rate 
Ln Y 






Age <  40 
Household earnings 
<  $6,000 
Nos. above limit 
Nos. below limit 
x2(9) 
The probability P 
of  positive asset 
holdings evaluated 
at the sample means 
The change in P for: 
























-2.300  0.012 
(0.807)  (0.860) 
1.066  0.622 
(0.159)  (0.170) 
0.127  0.095 
(0.084)  (0.090) 
0.021  0.017 
(0.003)  (0.004) 
(0.015)  (0.015) 
0.090  0.052 
(0.011)  (0.015) 
0.274  0.108 
(0.073)  (0.076) 
(0.034)  (0.041) 
(0.037)  (0.042) 
(0.048)  (0.052) 
2,592  8,676 
7,523  1,301 
814.0  219.2 
0.241  0.876 
-0.064  -0.017 
0.241  -0.004 
-0.457  -0.164 





25% increase in  ~  -0,015 
25% increase in __  0,004 
-0.018  -0.003 
0.007  0.003 























-  0.502 
-  0.004 
0.001 






















-  0.572 
-  0.743 
0.008 
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Assets 
Real  Busi- 
Home  Estate  ness 
RRSP  ONLFA  Cars  Equity  Equity  Equity  Debt 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 






































































-  0.067 


















-  0.182 























-  0.302 






















































0.006  0.002  0.007  -0.010  -0.003  0.051  0.049 
0.002  -0.001  0.006  0.008  0.002  -0.010  0.003 
"Dummy  variables take the value unity when the description applies to the household,  zero 
otherwise. Individual variables refer to the head of  a household. 416  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
Table 14.5  Asset Demand Equations (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 




Explanatory  Deposits  Bonds  Cash  Shares  RHOSP 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 







No. of  persons with 
life insurance 
Farm family dummy 
Married dummy 
Self-employed dummy 
Unemployed or not in 
labor force dummy 
No. of  children 
< 18 years 
No. of  children aged 








-  0.008 



















-  0.006 
(0.062) 
-0.113 





















-  0.001 
(0.00  I ) 
(0.00  1) 
0.001 







































(0.20  1) 
0.538 
(0.231) 













-  0.157 
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-  0.106 
2.839 
(0.872) 






























-  0.546 

































-  0.053 
(0.094) 
-  0.030 
(0.175) 
-  0.228 
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Assets 
Real  Busi- 
Home  Estate  ness 
RRSP  ONLFA  Cars  Equity  Equity  Equity  Debt 
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-  0.155 
-  0.146 
0.595 
(1.119) 
-  0.008 
(0.166) 
-  0.012 
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(0.004) 










-  1.305 















-  0.209 
(0.051) 














-  0.018 
-0.001 




-  0.098 
-0.349 
-  0.093 
(0,110) 
(0.115) 
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(0.1  12) 
(0.152) 
-  0.060 



































-  0.3.57 
-0.097 
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Explanatory  Deposits  Bonds  Cash  Shares  RHOSP 
















Inverse of  Mills’s ratio 
SE of  equation 
Degrees of  freedom 
Mean p, 














-  0.713 
(0,041) 
(0.011) 
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-  0.296 
(0.21  9) 
-  1.303 
(0.179) 



















-  0.024 
-0.065 











-  0.007 
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Assets 
Real  Busi- 
Home  Estate  ness 
RRSP  ONLFA  Cars  Equity  Equity  Equity  Debt 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 




-  0.155 
(0.087) 
-0.364 
(0.11  9) 
(0.088) 
-  1.046 
-  0.164 
(0.068) 

























































-  0.974 










-  0.429 
(0.040) 










-  0.022 
(0.009) 













-  0.247 
(0.044) 
(0.059) 
-  0.365 





























-  0.196 
(0.150) 




-  0.184 
(0.099) 
(0.093) 
























-  0.024 
-0.040 
-0.116  -0.505 
(0.250)  (0.115) 
(0.122)  (0.071) 
(0.144)  (0.095) 
-  0.546  0.122 
(0.135)  (0.080) 
(0.150)  (0.062) 
-0.474  -0.317 
-0.206  -0.114 
-  1.093  -  1.605 
-0.880  -0.324 
(0.106)  (0.066) 
-  -  0.148 
( -  )  (0.087) 
0.212  - 
(0.103)  ( -  ) 
-0.079  -  0.078 
(0.036)  (0.014) 
0.035  -0.074 
(0.021)  (0.012) 
(0.021)  (0.012) 
-0.001  -0.040 
-0.048  -0.038 
(0.025)  (0.015) 
(0.077)  (0.053) 
0.006  0.006 
(0.006)  (0.004) 
(0.676)  (0.461) 
-  1.075  0.560 
(0.103)  (0.189) 
1.782  1.884 
1,843  6,294 
0.456  0.085 
-0.038  -0.110 
-0.864  -0.194 
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The explanatory variables in the vector 2 of equation (5)  relating to 
wealth on which we focus are the ratios of the three components of wealth 
to  permanent income and the ratio of the two forms of  pension wealth to 
net worth (nonpension wealth). The first set of  variables captures the 
scale effects of wealth on asset demands, the second set the composition 
effect of wealth on portfolio behavior. Nonpension wealth has a signifi- 
cant depressing scale effect on the relative shares of all assets, apart from 
real estate and business equity. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on 
private pension and social security wealth are rarely significant and are of 
different size and sign. Statistically significant point estimates occur for 
RRSPs, cars, and debt for SSW and cash and business equity for PPW. 
The compositional influence of pension wealth is also very small, with 
significant coefficients found only for SSWN  in the demand for cars and 
debt. At a first glance it would appear that for the continuous choice 
decision the portfolio composition effects of  pension wealth are small, 
and this is borne out in the simulations in section 14.5. This finding may in 
part be a result of the level of aggregation of assets. If we had chosen to 
group assets into a smaller number of categories, some of the significant 
discrete choice effects would instead have shown up in the continuous 
choice model estimates. 
The dummy variables D1-D12  take the value unity when assets 1-12 
are held, zero otherwise.  These capture the effect  of  the particular 
portfolio combination the household holds on the relative share demand 
for each asset. The significant role of  these asset ownership dummies (and 
also the number of persons with life insurance, which is a form of dummy 
for this type of wealth) evidently justifies their inclusion in the estimated 
equations. In most cases, the gross effect of the ownership of other assets 
Footnotes for Table 14.5 
Index of  Explanatory Variables 
01-012 are dummy variables which take the value unity if the household has positive 
holdings of  assets  1-12,  where the numeric index corresponds to the equation column 
numbers. 
Dummy variables take the value unity when the description applies to the household, zero 
otherwise. Individual variables refer to the head of a household. A farm family is one which 
any member receives more than 50% of  his income fom self-employment in farming. The 
labor force status dummies relate to the week in which the survey was undertaken. 
VI-V7, a piecewise function of age, (A).  Define the following dummies for household i: b,, 
= 1  if A,  < 30, zero otherwise; bZr  = 1 if 30 <  A,  < 40, zero otherwise; b,,  = 1  if 40 <A,  < 
50, zero otherwise; bdr  = 1 if 50 < A, < 60, zero otherwise; bS,  = 1  if 60 < A, < 75, zero 
otherwise; b6, = 1  if 75 < A,,  zero otherwise. 
Then Vl-V7  correspond to: V1, = bl,(A,  ~  15) + 15 8:=2  bit;  V2, = &,(A, -  30) + 10 
= &(Ai -  60) + 225b,;  V7, = b,,,  which is a linear piecewise function 
27-3 bji;  V3, = b,,(A, -  40) + 10 2:=,  bit;  V4j = b,,(A, -  50) + 10) S:=s b,,;  V5, = bs,(A, 
-  60) + 156,,; 
of  age with a quadratic form between the ages of  60 and 75. 421  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
is to reduce the relative share held in a particular asset, and most of the 
positive dummy coefficients are insignificant. An exception to this is the 
increase in demand for deposits contingent on ownership of  cash or an 
RRSP, or life  insurance. Although it  is difficult  to summarize these 
results, some features are worth noting. Home equity (D9), primarily 
because of  its large share in homeowner household portfolios, has a very 
strong negative effect on the demand for all other assets. In contrast to 
ownership of  nonfinancial assets, the holding of financial assets appears 
to have an insignificant effect on the relative shares of financial assets held 
(except for stocks and shares). The demand for other nonliquid financial 
assets is virtually unaffected by other asset ownership, presumably be- 
cause of its residual nature. 
Relative share demand has a negative income elasticity for financial 
assets and a positive elasticity for nonfinancial assets. Households with 
lower permanent income are less willing or  unable to tie up their wealth in 
what in effect are less liquid assets. More so than in the discrete choice 
model, the interpretation of the role of  the tax rate is hampered by the 
nonlinearities  embodied in the exemption  and  deduction  rules.  The 
parameter estimates are accordingly mixed; given the initial deductions 
the positive effect on deposits, bonds, and stocks and shares is under- 
standable, but the insignificant influence on RHOSPs and RRSPs which 
have potentially large tax breaks is surprising. The insignificant effect on 
home and real estate equity may be attributed to the absence of mortgage 
interest deductibility for tax purposes. The imputed income from home 
ownership is untaxed. 
The  remaining explanatory variables are intended  to  cover socioecono- 
mic characteristics of  the household which might affect asset demands, 
transitorily or otherwise, such as labor force or marital status and the 
number of dependent children. To capture any life-cycle features  of these 
demands we include a piecewise function of  the household head’s age, 
using variables V1-V7  which allow us in a linear regression to incorporate 
a nonlinear function of age (these variables are discussed further in King 
and Dicks-Mireaux [1982]). Neither marriage or the number of children 
aged 18-24  in full-time schooling appear to influence portfolio composi- 
tion significantly. In the former case, notable exceptions are the under- 
standable positive influence on cash holdings and home equity and the 
less obvious negative one on real estate equity. In the latter case, this may 
reflect the relatively complete government funding of university educa- 
tion. In contrast young children have reduced the demand for financial 
assets, with no significant effects on nonfinancial assets other than to 
increase the demand for home equity. Neither labor force dummies (in 
contrast to low household earnings in discrete choice behavior) influence 
portfolio composition. Up  to the age bracket 60-75  years the age terms 
V1-V7  suggest, in  general, a  cumulative rise  in  relative  asset  share 422  Louis-David L. Dicks-MireauxIMervyn A. King 
demands. For both cars and debt the opposite is true. The terms V5  and 
V6 imply that between the age of  60 and 75 the age effect on the demand 
for financial assets reaches a maximum, while for other assets it continues 
to rise.  This  possibly  reflects a  greater  initial  role,  in  providing  for 
retirement income, of  decumulating financial assets. 
The inverse of Mills's ratio clearly indicates that in its absence sample 
selection  bias  will  occur in estimating  equations of  the form  (5) for 
nonfinancial assets and cash. The former are available to most house- 
holds in relatively less divisible units than financial assets, while zero 
holdings of  cash are clearly due to rather special factors. 
14.6  The Effect of Pension Wealth on Portfolio Composition 
In this section we use the empirical estimates in simulations to examine 
the effect of changes in pension wealth on household portfolio composi- 
tion. To do so correctly we must take into account two factors. First, 
changes in pension wealth may affect asset demands directly, as in the 
estimated equations, and indirectly, via their effect on the level of non- 
pension wealth. Second, because individual households hold very differ- 
ent combinations of  assets it is important to compute the response for 
each household and then to aggregate over households to discover the 
overall effect. 
In  the simulations  we  consider  separately the effects on portfolio 
composition of a 25% increase in the ratio of social security and private 
pension wealth to income. This particular choice of effect to simulate is 
suggested by the substantial earnings-related elements of both forms of 
wealth. In these exercises some assumptions had to be made. The effect 
of  these wealth changes on the discrete choice of which assets to hold is 
excluded, that is, the combination of assets each household owns is taken 
as given. This was done because within the present model specification 
we have been unable to devise a computationally simple way of incorpor- 
ating these  effects.  The estimates for all  12 demand  equations were 
presented in section 14.5, but to impose the adding-up constraint for asset 
shares we drop the home equity eq~ation.'~  Note that because the shares 
pj  are defined with respect to total assets this constraint only applies to  the 
11 assets and not to debt. Finally, the approach is a partial equilibrium 
one in that we take no account of  how the increase in  either type of 
pension is to be paid for or funded; and we assume the supply elasticity of 
the assets to be infinite. 
We incorporate in the simulations the possible adjustment in the level 
of nonpension wealth by households in the face of  changes in pension 
wealth. This response is modeled as follows: given an exogenous change 
in pension  wealth  an individual may  choose to hold  less nonpension 
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this wealth among assets. Formally this offsetting behavior may be inter- 
preted in terms of the coefficients of the wealth terms in the estimated 
equations. We can write the asset demand equations as 
(7) 
Tw  ssw  PPW 
Y  W  W 
In -  -al-+az-  + a3- 
+SOi+Uj,  j=1,.  . . ,J, 
where S  is the vector of  all nonwealth explanatory variables, 0 is its 
associated parameter vector, and Tw  is “effective”  total wealth. It is 
defined by 
(8)  Tw  = w + 6,SSW + 6,  PPW, 
where 6,  and SP  reflect the extent to which social security and private 
pension wealth, respectively, are regarded as equivalent to nonpension 
wealth. Equation (7) can, therefore, be written as 
PPW  ssw  + a2-  W 
W 
It is clear that, unless pension and nonpension wealth are considered as 
equivalent (i.e., 6,  = 6,  = 1),  there is no reason to expect the estimated 
coefficients on the three wealth-to-income ratios to  be the same. Indeed, 
they are not (see table 14.5), and for a given change in pension wealth, if 
households adjust their holdings of other wealth, they will do so by a 
value  of  6,  or 6,.  In  fact  the nature of  the offset  as implied  by  the 
individual  demand equations differs  as between  private  pension  and 
social security wealth and the estimates differ also across assets. The 
range of values is in fact quite wide: a -  $6.2 to +  $3.6 change in WIY with 
respect to a one-dollar rise in SSWIY, and -  $23.3 to +  $2.0 for PPWIY. 
This  lack  of  conformity  in  the estimated  offsets  across  equations is 
perhaps understandable in the absence of cross-equation constraints.Ib  If 
we regard  the offsets implied  by  the individual  demand equations as 
appropriate, changes in the ratio of pension wealth to permanent income 
will only affect asset demands via the composition effects a2’and  a3.  For 
example, any change in SSWIY has an effect of a16,A(SSW/Y)  on asset 
demand. This is simultaneously matched by a change of -  G,A(SSW/Y)  in 
WIY,  resulting in a change in asset demand equivalent to -  a16,A(SSW/ 
Y).  The combined effect is therefore zero. The changes in SSWand Wdo, 
however, affect asset demands by changing the value of the ratios SSWIW 
and PPWIW. If an alternative single value for the offset of  6o is imposed 
on all the equations, the net scale effect on asset share demands becomes 
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The effects of pension wealth on portfolio composition are examined 
for three different assumptions about the response of  nonpension wealth 
to changes in pension wealth. The three assumptions are that the offsets 
are (a)  zero; (b)  the weighted  average of  the offsets implied  by  the 
estimated demand equations, the weights being the aggregate shares of 
each asset in the sample;  and (c)  an estimate derived from an econometric 
model of  total household savings in nonpension wealth. 
The values of  the offsets (for a one-dollar increase in pension wealth) 
used were $0.56 and  -$6.03  for the weighted average of the demand 
equation estimates, and -  $0.27 and -  $0.23 for the aggregate estimate 
of  social  security  and  private pension  wealth,  respectively.  The zero 
offset can be interpreted as the short-run behavioral response to a change 
in pension wealth. Households smooth their adjustment of wealth via 
changes in savings but reallocate their portfolio immediately. The two 
nonzero offsets can be thought of as different steady states in which the 
complete desired adjustment of  the level of nonpension wealth has also 
been made. 
Before describing the simulation exercises we turn to the specification 
of the model of  total household savings. The model presented is  one 
which is developed in more detail in King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982). 
Wealth holdings (excluding pensions) over the life cycle are modeled as a 
nonlinear function of age (using the piecewise function adopted in the 
estimation of [5]),  household socioeconomic characteristics, and the size 
of private and social security wealth. To  control for differences in perma- 
nent income, all the wealth variables are deflated by it. The life-cycle 
model has been criticized on the grounds that one can observe a large 
number of households owning amounts of  wealth which appear incom- 
patible with the need to finance that part of retirement consumption not 
financed by pensions or social security. Indeed, in the Canadian sample 
we found this to be true. Nevertheless, the behavior of the majority of 
households is consistent with the predictions of the life-cycle model (King 
and Dicks-Mireaux 1982). Consequently,  in  estimating the model we 
exclude households with net worth of  less than $2,500. Table 14.6 shows 
the results of estimating a probit model for holding low net worth. This 
was used to compute the inverse of Mills’s ratio, which was included in 
the net worth regression, presented in table  14.7, to allow for sample 
selection bias induced by truncating the dependent variable. 
In table 14.6 we see that low educational attainment and household 
earnings  are correlated with  small wealth holdings.  This suggests an 
explanation for why such households may not act as predicted by the 
life-cycle model, namely,  that they do not  plan for the future or are 
unable to manage their own financial affairs, or may receive such low 
earnings that the optimal life-cycle consumption plan implies that retire- 425  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
Table 14.6  Probit Model for Small Wealth Holdings 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable"  W <  $2,500 
Constant 
Ln Y 
Household earnings < $6,000 
No. of  persons unemployed 





Education: secondary or above 
Nos. below limit 

























"Dummy  variables take the value unity when the description applies to the household, zero 
otherwise. Individual variables refer to the head of a household. 
bA family  in  which  any  member  receives  more  than  50%  of  his  income  from  self- 
employment in farming. 
ment consumption is less than or equal to the expected value of  old age 
social security payments. 
Estimates of  the model, 
are shown in table 14.7. 
The variables are defined as earlier. In addition, D1  equals one if 
household i is eligible for a private pension plan, zero otherwise, and 6, 
and S,,  are the implied offsets given by the definition of  total wealth in (8). 426  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
As the life-cycle model predicts, asset holdings rise (apart from a small 
dip at ages 50-60) up to the age bracket 60-75 and then fall. The implied 
offset to nonpension wealth from an additional dollar of social security or 
private pension wealth is 27 and 23 cents, respectively; the larger effect of 
Table 14.7  Net Worth (W) Regression: Truncated Sample W > $2,500 









Farm family dummy 
No. of  persons unemployed 
No. of  adults in household 




Inverse of  Mills’s ratio 
S.E. of  equation 
R2 













-  0.009 
(0.007) 
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the former possibly due to  its being indexed. The macroeconomic effects 
of introducing a public pension plan using a hypothetical but broadly 
realistic simulation model of the economic-demographic system of Can- 
ada in the mid-seventies is examined by Denton and Spencer (1981). 
Among several experiments they consider the effect of different savings 
offset assumptions with respect to contributions. 
Additional explanatory variables were introduced. A test for homo- 
thetic preferences is possible by including permanent income. The sign of 
the coefficient implies that the higher is permanent income, the lower is 
the ratio of  wealth to permanent income. The elasticity evaluated at the 
mean value of YIW is -  0.31. Farm families possess greater wealth than is 
predicted by the simple model which may reflect the importance of  land 
prices to the value of  such families’ net worth. Unemployment  has a 
depressing effect on wealth, and household size appears to have little 
significant influence on wealth holding. Measured wealth does not in- 
clude the value of  life insurance policies, and we know only the number of 
persons in each household covered by life insurance. We might expect 
that, ceteris paribus, the more members covered the less would be the 
level of  household wealth invested in other assets. But in fact the coeffi- 
cient on the life insurance variable is positive,  suggesting rather that 
purchase  of  life  assurance  is  correlated with  a  greater than  average 
preference to save (resulting perhaps from a higher than average degree 
of  risk aversion). 
The simulation exercises are now described. The purpose of the first 
simulation is to illustrate how the effect of  a change in pension wealth 
differs between two households which differ with regard to the number of 
assets held. This is done for a 25% increase in SSWIY using the wealth 
offset from the aggregate savings model reported above. The two port- 
folios we consider are the “modal” portfolio, which consists of deposits, 
cash, cars, home equity, and personal debt, and a “complete” portfolio in 
which all assets are held. As shown in table 14.2 portfolios of five assets 
are the most popular, and  almost half  of  these consist  of  the modal 
portfolio (1,022 households). In each case the predicted portfolios (col- 
umns 1  and 2 in table 14.8) are calculated using the mean characteristics 
of those holding the modal portfolio. These were permanent income of 
$24,098, nonpension wealth of $29,286, social security wealth of $77,684, 
and private pension wealth of $32,311. The household head is 41 years 
old, and the dummies imply  high  probabilities of  being married  and 
employed but not of being a farm family. The mean number of adults with 
life insurance and of dependent children above and below 18 years of age 
is 0.75, 1.59, and 0.07, respectively. 
The two predicted portfolios obviously differ, with the proportion of 
assets held in nonfinancial form being less in the complete portfolio.” 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 14.8 give the changes in asset shares following 
the increase in SSWIY. In both cases the effects are small. With more 428  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
Table 14.8  Predicted Portfolio of the “Average” Individual with 
the Modal Portfolio and a Complete Portfolio 
Following a 25% Increase in SSWiY 
Assets 
Initial  Change in Portfolio 
Portfolio 70  (Percentage Points) 
Hold 5  Hold All  Hold 5  Hold All 




Liquid financial assets 





Nonliquid financial assets 
Total financial assets 
Passenger cars 
Home equity 
Real estate equity 
Business equity 
Personal debt 



































-  0.05 





-  0.02 
0.05 
-  0.27 
-  0.01 
-  0.25 
-  0.32 
0.07 
0.48 
-  0.19 
-  0.04 
0.32 
0.10 
assets being  held, the absolute  changes in  the modal  five  assets are 
reduced. In the modal portfolio the shares of financial and nonfinancial 
assets rise  and  fall,  respectively,  while  in  the complete  portfolio the 
opposite occurs. 
In tables 14.9 and 14.10 we have simulated the effect of  changes in 
pension  wealth  on portfolio  composition  for  a  single  representative 
household which holds the mean portfolio of the sample of 9,788 house- 
holds. Both tables 14.9 and 14.10 indicate that neither change in both 
types of pension wealth has a large effect absolutely or proportionately 
on portfolio composition. Comparing the two tables we observe that the 
effects on portfolio  composition of  changes in  both types of  pension 
wealth are similar for the zero wealth offset assumption. For the nonzero 
offsets the changes in nonfinancial assets are negative in both tables but 
larger for changes in private pension wealth. The direction of change in 
financial  asset  holdings  is  different  for  the two increases in  pension 
wealth. For example, social security in contrast to private pension wealth 
has a negative effect on the portfolio share of  RRSPs held. 
The final simulations presented in tables 14.11 and 14.12 show the 
effect of the two changes in pension wealth on the aggregate portfolio of 
the sample. The method employed was to calculate the change in the 429  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
Table 14.9  Change in the Mean Portfolio of the Sample for a 
25% Increase in SSWIY, Given for Different Offsets 
in Nonpension Wealth with Respect to Social Security Wealth 
Change in Asset Share (Percentage Points) 




Initial  Demand 
Asset  Equation  Aggregate 




Liquid financial assets 





Nonliquid financial assets 
Total financial assets 
Passenger cars 
Home equity 
Real estate equity 
Business equity 
Personal debt 

















-  0.004 
-  0.03 














































value of  wealth held in each asset for each household and then to compute 
the new economy-wide portfolio. Since households own different com- 
binations of assets, it would be incorrect to simulate this effect by using a 
representative household assumed to hold the intitial mean sample port- 
folio. A comparison of  tables 14.9-14.10  and 14.11-14.12  reveals the 
aggregation biases inherent in doing this. In converting shares to absolute 
values and in calculating the new level of  total assets (net worth plus 
debt), the relevant offsets to net worth and the change in personal debt as 
predicted by our equation estimates were used. 
The magnitude of the predicted changes in portfolio shares reported in 
tables  14.11 and 14.12 are small,  and consequently we  refrain from 
making  strong statements about the differences  in  these  changes  as 
between assets or between the two types of  pension wealth increase. The 
results reported in table 14.12 for the weighted average offset are clearly 
an exception. The large changes are a result of the high value of the offset 
to nonpension wealth. For several assets this led to negative predicted 
asset  shares, which  makes little sense in  our framework.L8  For these 430  Louis-David L. Dicks-MireauxIMervyn A. King 
Table 14.10  Change in the Mean Portfolio of the Sample for a 
25% Increase in PPWIY, Given for Different Offsets 
in Nonpension Wealth with Respect to Private Pension Wealth 
Assets 
Change in Asset Share (Percentage Points) 





Asset  Equation  Aggregate 




Liquid financial assets 





Nonliquid financial assets 
Total financial assets 
Passenger cars 
Home equity 
Real estate equity 
Business equity 
Personal debt 




























-  1.11 
-  0.04 
0.71 
































-  0.45 
0.01 
reasons we exclude these results from the discussion below.  Negative 
shares were also predicted, when using the aggregate model offset, for 
cash in both tables. For the zero offset assumption the predicted asset 
share changes are similar in both tables, and apart from home equity are 
negative. When thc aggregate offset is used almost half of the predicted 
changes in shares are positive. The signs of these changes are similar for 
the two increases in pension wealth but larger in absolute size for the 
increase in social security wealth. 
The simulations appear to suggest rather small effects on portfolio 
composition of changes in pension wealth. However, before jumping to 
such a conclusion one should take account of the exclusion of  the in- 
fluence of  pension wealth on the choice of  which assets to hold. The 
estimates of the discrete choice model of asset demands reported in table 
14.4  indicate that such an influence exists. At the bottom of this table the 
change in the probability, evaluated at the sample means and assuming a 
zero offset to nonpension wealth, of holding an asset is given for the two 
increases in pension wealth employed in the simulations. In addition, it is 431  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
Table 14.11  Aggregate Portfolio of the Sample, and Its 





Liquid financial assets 





Nonliquid financial assets 
Toral financial assets 
Passenger cars 
Home equity 
Real estate equity 
Business equity 
Personal debt 
Total nonfinancial assets 
Change in Asset Share (Percentage Points) 
Offset to Net Worth 
Initial 
Asset 
Share (%)  Zero 
9.44  -0.22 
2.58  -0.14 
0.23  -0.10 
12.25  -0.46 
1.27  -  0.03 
0.16  -  0.003 
1.79  -0.18 











-  0.13 
0.98 
-  0.16 






Equation  Aggregate 
Estimates  Estimate 
0.94  -0.91 
-0.12  -0.11 
-1.41  -  0.38 
-1.41  -0.38 
-0.16  0.07 
0.09  -0.07 
-  0.26  -  0.10 
-  0.23  0.18 
-0.56  0.08 
-  1.15  -1.32 
3.68  -2.80 
2.28  0.45 
-  0.97  0.55 
-  3.84  3.12 
1.15  1.32 
4.17  -3.28 
clear from table 14.8 that a change in the number and type of  assets held 
will affect the nature of the portfolio composition adjustment. 
14.7  Conclusion 
The major result of  our study is that, whereas there seems to be an 
identifiable effect of pension wealth on total private saving, the effect on 
portfolio composition is less significant. Moreover, within the area of 
portfolio composition the main effect is in terms of the particular number 
and combination of  assets held rather than the amount of any given asset 
as a proportion of  total wealth. 
We have also demonstrated the need for, and the difficulties of con- 
structing, a joint discrete and continuous choice model of asset demands. 
The empirical  results  suggest  that  to ignore  the joint  nature of  the 
decision process would be an incorrect specification of  household port- 
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Table 14.12  Aggregate Portfolio of the Sample, and its 
Change after a 25% Increase in PPWIY 
Change in Asset Share (Percentage Points) 




Initial  Demand 
Asset  Equation  Aggregate 




Liquid finiancial assets 





Nonliquid financial assets 
Total financial assets 
Passenger cars 
Home equity 
Real estate equity 
Business equity 
Personal debt 


















-  0.05 
-0.10 
-  0.42 
-  0.01 
-0.01 
-  0.01 
-  0.02 
-  0.05 
-0.47 
-  0.61 
1.11 





-  1.17 
-  1.57 
-  3.20 
-  0.48 
-  2.62 
-  2.31 
1.75 
-  3.66 
-  6.86 
-  14.41 




-  16.01 
-  0.55 
-  0.03 
-  0.26 
-0.84 
0.03 




-  0.75 






Appendix: The Construction of  Estimates of 
Individual Permanent Income 
The model for permanent income (defined as normal  age-adjusted 
manual earnings) isI9 
In  Y,  = Ziy  +  si -  c(Ai), 
where Zi  is a vector of observable characteristics for individual i, y is the 
associated parameter vector, and s, is an unobservable variable measur- 
ing characteristics, such as skill or drive, which is constructed such that its 
mean value is zero and has variance u:.  The term c(AJ  is a cohort effect 
which reflects that, for given Z,  younger generations are better off than 
their elders because of  technical progress and capital accumulation. 
Current  earnings differ from permanent income because there exists an 
age-earnings profile  over the life cycle, and a transitory  component. 
Earnings in year r are therefore given by 
(A2)  In  Ei,  = In Y,  + h(A, -  2)  + uir. 433  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
The function  h measures the age-earnings  profile  (assumed  constant 
across the population), and A is a “standard” age with respect to which 
permanent income is defined. The transitory component of earnings, uir, 
is assumed to have zero mean and variance a,“, and to be uncorrelated 
with si. Combining (Al) and (A2) gives the earnings equation 
(A31  In&, = Ziy  + g(AJ  + si + uir, 
where g(Air)  = h(Ai, -  A)  -  c(Ajt).  The error term si + uir  has zero mean 
and variance us2  + uu2.  Estimation of (A3) provides consistent estimates 
of  y  and the function  g. By  imposing  a  cohort  effect  using  outside 
information, both h and c could be identified. The minimum variance 
estimator of  si, the unobservable individual-specific effect, is given by 
(A41  3 = a(si + Ui,), 
where 
2 
US  a= 
a:  + a; 
Therefore, given values for u;  and a;,  4  and c, permanent income may 
be constructed for each individual. With observations on earnings for 
only one  year, it is not possible to  obtain estimates of a:  and a;  as well as 
y from (A3). A value of 0.5 for a  was therefore assumed. This value was 
based on the results of  studies which used longitudinal data to estimate 
the relative magnitudes of  u:  and uU2.*O 
The earnings equation (A3) was estimated for male household heads 
and for wives separately. Female-headed households were deleted from 
the sample because a substantial fraction of  these were headed by elderly 
women, probably widows, and for them permanent income is determined 
primarily by the lifetime earnings of the deceased husband, for which no 
information was available. 
Equation (A3) implicitly assumes individuals are in “full-time”  em- 
ployment  and does not allow for systematic changes in labor supply 
resulting from spells of  unemployment during part of the year. Hence the 
equation was estimated for all individuals whose annual earnings were 
greater than $2,000. The sample selection bias induced by this truncation 
of  the dependent variable was corrected for using the two-stage proce- 
dure proposed  by  Heckman (1979). Equation (A3) was estimated by 
OLS, with the inverse of  Mills’s ratio computed from a probit model of 
earnings greater or less than $2,000 included as an additional explanatory 
variable, to give consistent estimates of  y and the  g function. A discussion 
of  the estimates can be found in King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and 
details of  them are available on request. 
For  individuals included in the earnings regressions, permanent in- 
come is equal to the age-adjusted structural component of  earnings given 
by  observable variables,  plus one-half of  the residual in the earnings 434  Louis-David L. Dicks-Mireaux/Mervyn A. King 
equation. For the excluded  1,873 male  household  heads, permanent 
income was  predicted  by  the structural  component alone. The same 
procedure was adopted for wives but with an explicit adjustment (based 
on educational attainment and the presence of  dependent children) for 
nonparticipation in the labor force at various stages of the life cycle. By 
this method, the estimate of the permanent income of  wives is indepen- 
dent of  that of  their husbands, and vice versa. In neither the probit nor 
earnings regressions of husbands or wives do explanatory variables per- 
taining to  the spouse enter. It is not entirely obvious which characteristics 
of  a spouse should affect the labor participation or  earnings choice of the 
other. To the extent that some do, there is the more general problem of 
how to model this. Does the wife make her decision conditional on that of 
her husband, or vice versa? We choose to assume that these decisions are 
made independently. 
Household permanent income is the sum of the estimates for husbands 
and wives. Mean estimated permanent income of men is $15,928 and of 
wives $7,451. 
Notes 
1. Strictly speaking, the relevant variables are the expected relative prices and inflation 
rate, which will in general differ across individuals. This source of variation is allowed for 
insofar as it can be explained by the observable individual characteristics included in the 
demand equations. 
2. All computations on this data base were carried out by the authors and should not be 
attributed to Statistics Canada. Further details of  the data base may be found in Statistics 
Canada (1979). 
3. This is because 
I  I 
Z  J.,=  Z  J!/[J!(J-j)!]=2’, 
I=o  C  I-o 
which includes the combination owning zero assets. 
4. In the context of  a logistic distribution as applied to the ownership of  consumer 
durables,  Amemiya  (1975)  examines  a  three-good  case  and Billowes  (1982) presents 
estimates for a model with six durables. In the latter case the number of dummy variables 
was too great to allow estimation of  the model. 
5. The estimated age-earnings profiles are those estimated for the purpose of construct- 
ing our measure of  permanent income. 
6.  A brief summary of the evidence on pension plan indexation in Canada, and relevant 
references, can be found in Dicks-Mireaux  (1981). 
7.  Other sources of information about the retirement income arrangements in Canada 
are Statistics Canada (1978) and Wolfson (1979). 
8. This calculation differs as between three types of asset. For personal use property, 
such as personal and household effects, cars, boats, or cottages, gains are reported only if 
the proceeds of  sale were more than $1,000. A gain on own homes is not taxed if the house 
was a principal residence. Listed personal property (works of  art, jewelry, and collectors’ 435  Portfolio Composition and Pension Wealth 
items) is similarly treated except that losses may be offset against gains where the original 
adjusted cost is greater than $1,000. All gains and losses on other capital properties must be 
reported. If  the loss exceeds $1,000, the excess may be used to reduce taxable capital gains 
and other income in 1975,1977, and future years. For business, farm, or professional equity 
and real estate (other than owner-occupied homes), capital cost or depreciation allowances 
are available. Rates for commonly held assets are 5% and 10% for buildings of brick and 
wood, respectively, 20% on machinery and equipment, and 30% on vehicles. 
9. The American IRA and Keogh plans, before the 1981  change in the tax law, were only 
available to self-employed persons or those without company-sponsored plans. 
10. Certain features of  the tax  law facilitate  this optimizing behavior.  Spouses may 
contribute to each others’ RHOSP and RRSP, and unused portions of eligible deductions 
for interest and dividend income are transferable. This suggests that when deductions are 
not fully exhausted, and a husband’s marginal tax rate is greater than or equal to his wife’s, 
our procedure is appropriate. 
11. A more detailed account is available on request from the authors. 
12. In the case of Quebec the procedure is different, and allowance was made for this. 
13. To compute a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the demand equations, 
we required the same sample to be used in both the probit and second stage of the estimation 
procedures.  Consequently, households for which the asset share equaled unity were ex- 
cluded from the probit model for that asset. 
14. The insignificant negative  effect of  the tax rate on the probability of  owning an 
RHOSP may partly be a problem of  endogeneity, as the RHOSP deduction was incorpo- 
rated in the calculation of  the tax rate. 
15. Home equity was chosen because of  its large share in household portfolios. Conse- 
quently, any proportional errors in forecasting changes in its share due to its residual role 
will be reduced. Bonds, which are the most susceptible to measurement error in the survey, 
were not used because of their small share. In any event, as most of  the predicted changes 
were of small magnitude,  any errors are also small. Indeed, the difference between the 
change in the portfolio share of home equity predicted by the estimated equation and that 
calculated as a residual was typically no larger than  i0.5  percentage points. 
16. One may also ask whether,  if  the offsets were constrained  to be similar across 
equations, the remaining parameter estimates would change significantly. 
17. A disturbing factor in this exercise is that without imposing the adding-up constraint 
on the predicted portfolio of all assets, the share of home equity was only 9.3%. With only 
five assets the difference between the predicted and imposed share of home equity was only 
18. The possibility of predicting negative aggregate portfolio shares of assets arises for 
the following reason. In predicting the new level of total assets at the level of the individual 
household, nothing in the model precludes negative holdings. This is more likely the larger 
the offset employed in the simulation. Consequently, although the predicted asset shares by 
construction must be positive, when they are multiplied by total household assets to get the 
value of each asset held negative values can arise. In the simulation performed the aggregate 
value of  net worth and total assets after summing over households was always positive. 
However, the aggregate value of  the decline in holdings of  particular assets was in several 
cases greater than the initial value, and hence the predicted aggregate shares are negative. 
19. This definition excludes the annuity value of  receipts of  gifts and inheritances, on 
which no data are available in our sample, and also “supernormal”  profits (and losses). 
20.  These studies, which used United States data, were Lillard (1977), Lillard and Willis 
(1978), and Lillard  and Weiss (1979).  See King and Dicks-Mireaux  (1982) for further 
discussion of  this point. 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
In this chapter, Dicks-Mireaux and King  have made an ambitious 
attempt to deal with a number of  difficult empirical problems. For this, 
they  are to be commended. Not surprisingly,  perhaps, the ultimate 
findings  are  somewhat  inconclusive.  Nevertheless,  many  interesting 
issues arise along the way. 
To estimate  the effects  of pension  wealth  on portfolio  allocation, 
Dicks-Mireaux and King estimate both probit equations, to determine 
whether individuals hold particular  assets, and share equations, given 
that they do. Before doing this, they must calculate  many of  the key 
explanatory  variables, such as permanent income, pension wealth, social 
security wealth, and marginal tax rate. In each case, they demonstrate 
great attention to detail, doing an admirable job in light of the limitations 
in the raw data. However, many of  these limitations are rather severe. It 
is unlikely that one could improve greatly on the accuracy of the calcula- 
tions that Dicks-Mireaux and King perform, but it is also unlikely that 
some of  their constructed  variables are very  accurate. For example, 
pension wealth of the working population is based on the pensions being 
received  by  current retirees with  the same characteristics.  Given the 
changes that have occurred  over time in  the coverage and nature of 
private pensions (the raison d’etre of this study, after all), this may be a 
problem. Likewise, the permanent income of  women is adjusted for the 
fact that women in general do not work full-time over their lifetimes. 
However, the adjustment ignores the possibility of  unobservable differ- 
ences in participation among  women with the same observable character- 
istics but different current participation behavior: two otherwise observa- 
tionally equivalent women, one who works and one who doesn’t, have 
the same predicted pattern of  lifetime labor force participation. Presum- 
ably, variables relating to the husband’s characteristics might be included 
here,  although  this  would  raise  additional  questions with  which  the 
authors, quite justifiably, prefer not to deal. 
The arrival at the estimable equation (5) is preceded by a journey 
through combinatorics. Section 14.3 of  the chapter shows just how dif- 
ficult a task Dicks-Mireaux and King have undertaken. I would take issue 
with their ultimate estimation procedure for a couple of reasons. First, it 
is not  clear why the logistic transformation  is appropriate. The asset 
shares are bounded above and below by one and zero, as are probabili- 
ties, but the zero bound represents a constraint rather than a natural 
limit.  Since we  observe  a  truncated version  of  the underlying error 
distribution (for which the authors correct by  inclusion of  the inverse 
Alan J. Auerbach is affiliated with  the University of  Pennsylvania and is a research 
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Mills’s ratio from the relevant probit equation), why should the symmetry 
of  the logistic distribution hold for the observed errors? 
Perhaps a more serious problem with equation (5)  is the inclusion of 
dummy variables  for other positive  asset  holdings.  To  evaluate  this 
procedure, we must know first how the error terms ui  are generated. If 
they come from allocation mistakes, or from individual-specific differ- 
ences, one would expect them to be correlated across equations: if I buy 
more housing, I will buy less of  all other assets. This means that the 
probability of  holding other assets, and hence the dummy variables for 
such assets, may be correlated with the error term in (5). This would lead 
to inconsistent estimates of  the coefficients Ck,. 
Turning to the empirical findings, I find it somewhat difficult to inter- 
pret  the separate effects  of  the different  wealth  income  and  wealth 
composition terms. According to equations (7)-(9),  we should think of 
the coefficients of SSWIY  and PPWIY as telling us the extent to which 
these two types of pension wealth are perceived as net household wealth 
in the sense analyzed by Barro. Meanwhile, the coefficients of SSWIW 
and PPWIW are intended to indicate the effects of wealth composition. 
However, this seems like an artificial distinction. For example, social 
security wealth, being less liquid, may not count fully as “real” wealth, 
but this would  be the same reason  for its effect on portfolio shares. 
Moreover, given the potential errors in calculating permanent income, 
wealth may be almost as good a measure of permanent income as the 
value used. As a result, it is not surprising that the implied wealth offsets 
from the equations are rather unbelievable. 
The pension variables do appear to help in explaining whether indi- 
viduals hold certain assets (table 14.4), but in the asset demand equations 
neither social security wealth nor pension wealth (divided by income or 
wealth) has a very significant effect. This is difficult to interpret, as are the 
coefficients for these wealth variables from specific equations. 
Except for those simulations that use the wealth offset inferred from 
the asset demand equations using (9), the estimated effects of changes in 
pension wealth or social security wealth on portfolio composition  are 
remarkably small. However, this outcome merely reflects the poor per- 
formance of  these variables in the asset demand equations. 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of this chapter is its attention to 
modeling the portfolio behavior of typical investors, who often hold a 
small number of the assets available. While I have expressed reservations 
about some of the techniques used in this chapter, further work along 
these lines should be encouraged. 438  Louis-David L. Dicks-MireauxIMervyn A. King 
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